MBA. Hellen Ruiz Hidalgo
Strategic Communicator
Foreign Trade Observatory (OCEX)
Vice-Rectory for Research - Distance Learning State University (UNED)
Introduction. In this capsule, which is OCEX's second installment on the subject of the BRICS+ countries, we will explain in greater depth the development of the BRICS, their evolution since their summits, the current situation and the prospects that lie ahead. This capsule seeks to provide an overview of the BRICS+ countries in the context of a changing era marked, among other things, by changes in the relative weight of the countries that govern global geopolitical governance. That regency has been dominated, since 1975, by the G7 countries, under US leadership. The BRICS+ are manifesting themselves as a challenge to the G7's control of the multilateral organizations that govern the world economy. We share with you in the following link the first installment of OCEX, on this topic, entitled: Capsule #1-2024|BRICS: an alternative geopolitical and economic bloc.
BRICS+ catalyst for a new international order. The acronym BRICS+ refers to the countries that make up a coalition that coordinate their economic and diplomatic efforts around common objectives. They function as a loose bloc. Basically, they are an informal grouping of emerging economies that associate to achieve geopolitical influence in accordance withtheir growing economic weight and enormous demographic size.
Its original name was “BRIC” and originates from the initial letters of its founding countries: Brazil, Russia, India and China. South Africa was added to them, changing its name to BRICS. After the summit in South Africa, five new members were added, making its more accepted designation BRICS+.
BRICS+ base of scoop. The term BRIC was originally coined by Goldman Sachs economist Jim O'Neill in 2001, in which he outlined the growth of Brazil, Russia, India and China (“BRIC”) and made a warning and recommendation. He warned that these countries were on the verge of overtaking almost all of the dominant rich economies of the G7, except for the United States which would continue to compete closely with China. He recommended that they be taken on with their weight in global financial decision-making bodies. His warning was heeded. His recommendation was not heeded and this resulted in these countries opting to group together so that their weight would be considered in global economic governance.
Discrimination in global governance. Discrimination in global governance. At first glance, it was not clear that the awareness of discrimination in world governance would lead to a movement of countries with the most dynamic productive, commercial and demographic evolution and less taken into consideration. Nor was there, in this realization of organic handicap in multilateral organizations, the weight that the punitive use of the dollar could have to mobilize against countries that were against the United States.
Context of the origin of the BRICS+. The origin of the BRICS+ is therefore due to a complex combination of geopolitical discontent, national senses of monetary defense and old claims linked to the colonial and neocolonial past after the Second World War. The functional separation of the developed world from the emerging world evoked that past-present and conjured up the need for concerted action.
It was not the first time that the international concertation of less developed countries was invoked to seek ways to build a community of nations with similar problems, as well as to undertake actions aimed at alleviating their economic dependence, fundamentally based on the negative evolution of the terms of trade, for the dependent countries: increasing value of manufacturing exchanged for decreasing value of primary goods.
“The Brandt Line”. An attempt at geographical precision between development and underdevelopment was made in the Report of the Brandt Commission, chaired by German Chancellor Willy Brandt at the end of the 1970s, which presented a so-called “Brandt Line” as an expression of the division of the world into North and South, as a georeferenced expression of the gaps between the differentiated development of the world's regions. The “Brandt Line” divided the world in terms of economic development into North and South.
From the point of view of geopolitical mobilization, the first major attempt was the construction of the Non-Aligned Movement, founded at the Bandung Conference in 1955, under the leadership of India, Egypt and Indonesia.
There were also national and regional strategies to overcome the terms of trade disadvantage, such as the attempts at Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) that took place in Latin America and in Asian countries such as Korea. But the fundamentals changed when the Cold War ended and the absence of ideological rivalries between countries allowed the free movement of capital.
With the ability to invest where there were better returns, the search for economic efficiency pushed companies from the developed world to move their factories to the underdeveloped world in search of lower labor costs. The effect of this was the double process of manufacturing industrialization in the dependent countries, on the one hand, and industrial manufacturing relocation from the United States and Europe, on the other. This has changed the pieces of the international commercial geopolitical chessboard. Consider, for example, that China currently has a manufacturing output three times greater than that of the United States and already accounts for 35% of the world's gross manufacturing output.
To these processes should be added two decisive components that would push the larger emerging countries to defend themselves. One was NATO's decision to expand, threateningly encircling Russia. The other was the increasingly widespread use of the US dollar as a sanctioning weapon against countries that went against its guidelines in any way.
Birth of BRICS+ as a defensive movement. Russia was the first to convene a meeting of the four founding countries, in 2009. Its President Vladimir Putin had been confronted with NATO's decision to expand into Ukraine. He had warned that it would pose an existential threat to Russia. Russia warned that it would not tolerate NATO expansion into Ukraine. At the same time the Russian establishment understood that the West would not stop its enveloping move against Russia. It also understood that it would not be enough to oppose this movement with military force, but that it would also be threatened with economic isolation due to the dominance of the dollar in the hands of the United States, which would be used as a financial weapon in a possible war.
BRICS+ Russian precautionary initiative. Thus, it was that, in an extraordinarily proactive manner, Russia called for the organization of several countries that could also fear economic aggression by the U.S. dominance of the dollar. Thus, the BRICS+ were the product of a precautionary Russian initiative, which has allowed it to overcome all the sanctions it has been subjected to in its confrontation with NATO in Ukraine. Just as the United States tried to economically break Russia in 6 months, excluding it from all international transactions in dollars, Russia, for its part, had already spent 14 years building its international support network: the BRICS+.
BRICS+ towards a multilateralism without hegemonies. In 2009, Russia hosted and hosted, in Yekaterinburg, the first official summit. South Africa joined a year later at China's invitation, forming the five-country grouping that would persist until 2023, when the 15th BRICS Summit was held in Johannesburg, South Africa, where its expansion was decided.
By the time of the Johannesburg Summit, the BRICS+ countries had already had 15 years of excellent consensual functioning without hegemonism of any kind. Their initiatives and proposals were very attractive to many other emerging countries with regional influence. That is why several countries had applied to join.
Johannesburg Summit in 2023. The first major wave of expansion was decided. Six new applicant countries were invited to join: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). All accepted. Although months later Argentina declined to participate, when its new president, Javier Milei, opted for a pro-Western orientation of extreme neoliberalism.
Kazan Summit in Russia. In January 2024, the XVI Kazan Summit was held in Russia, where Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates joined as scheduled. Delegations from thirty-six nations and six international organizations, including the United Nations, gathered in Kazan.
Thirteen other countries were invited to join the organization in the new category created in Kazan of “Associate Members”. They were: Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Turkey, Vietnam, Uganda and Uzbekistan.
High point of the BRICS+ evolution. On January 1, 2025, eight of them accepted the invitation received in Kazan and formally joined the new category. Indonesia was the first of them to become an official member, on January 6.
Despite the enormous expansion and increased weight of the BRICS+, there is an elephant in the room: Saudi Arabia, a country invited to join and with which there are excellent relations with all BRICS+ member countries, has not yet responded to an invitation to join the BRICS that was extended to it during the Johannesburg summit in 2023. Ankara, for its part, had expressed its desire to become a BRICS member. But Turkey, which received an invitation in Kazan in 2024, is still silent on this offer of membership status.
Indonesia's entry is significant as it is the largest economy in Southeast Asia and occupies a strategic position in the Indo-Pacific. In addition, there is a whole aspect of enormous geopolitical symbolism. Indonesia presided over the birth of the Non-Aligned Movement in its capital, Bandung, and was subsequently the victim of a CIA-sponsored massacre of hundreds of thousands of communist militants. With its accession to the BRICS+, Indonesia takes up its vocation against neocolonialism and inserts itself in the modern movement of countries of the Global South that claims its space for international recognition.
The significance of Saudi Arabia and Turkey in the world is of great transcendence. Saudi Arabia is the largest oil exporter and a key player in the Middle East. Turkey, for its part, would be the first NATO member to join the BRICS+.
Each of these three countries has managed its relations with BRICS+ differently. The comparison between Indonesia's accession, Saudi Arabia's ambiguity and Turkey's aspirations offers valuable insight into the evolving role of BRICS+ in the international system and how emerging powers assert their interests, amid geopolitical uncertainty. It thus gains growing credibility, increases its attractiveness and creates a growing lineup of economies eager for viable alternatives to Western-led institutions. But the addition of more countries may dilute the group's ability to act in unison. The accessions of Turkey and Saudi Arabia would represent a qualitative step toward broader changes in the world order. It would also be an illustration of BRICS+ dynamics enhancing strategic autonomy and complicating Western geopolitical leadership in global economic governance.
In Kazan, the BRICS continued the collective, cross-cultural effort they have been promoting since their founding. Beyond the vision of their economic objectives, which are important but not exclusive, Kazan emphasized the potential of this new informal grouping of countries to design multifunctional and multifaceted spaces with its member countries.
BRICS+ as an international support network. From there, international relations are being formed based on a multipolarity that redeems the metaphysical universe prior to the industrial revolution and the colonization of the world by the Western industrial powers. It is a rescue of the cultural contents of the ancient “state-civilizations” (Persian, Ottoman, Muslim, Russian, Chinese, Amerindian, etc.).
The BRICS+ emerged from Kazan with ten countries joined by Indonesia and together they have a combined population of more than 3.5 billion inhabitants, 51% of the world's population. The aggregate economies of its members add up to a collective GDP of more than $28.5 trillion, 40.4% of the world economy. From an energy point of view, the BRICS+ countries produce almost 50% of the world's oil production and account for about 35% of total oil consumption. This is because, from the production point of view, the BRICS+ countries include Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as members or strong supporters, in addition to Russia. From the point of view of energy consumption, China represents their largest demand.
Qualitative regional geopolitical weight. In addition to quantitative factors, the BRICS+ have a strong qualitative regional geopolitical weight, as they are made up of major world-regional powers, such as China, Russia, Iran, South Africa and Brazil, countries of great influence in their respective regions.
BRICS members and partners represent the most important countries in the world in the production of crucial raw materials, such as grains, meat, crude oil, natural gas and strategic minerals such as iron, copper and nickel, as well as lithium and rare earths.
The BRICS+ manifest themselves as a challenge to the control of the G7. To understand the geopolitical vectors of the evolution of the different groups of countries, BRICS+ vs. G7, it is important to compare the evolution of these various groupings of nations: the G7 countries now account for only 29.08% of world GDP (PPP), showing a decisive decline from 1990, when they accounted for 52%.
Functioning as a flexible bloc. The bloc is based on consensus decision-making and is largely informal: it has no defined statutes, secretariat or common funds. Each country holds the presidency for one year and is responsible for priorities and for organizing a summit of heads of state that meets annually. The bloc has sought to coordinate the economic and diplomatic policies of its members, establish new financial institutions and manage their economies and trade by seeking to counteract, at least relatively, dependence on the U.S. dollar, especially by promoting direct trade among its members in national currencies. The BRICS+ countries are not seeking to build an alternative to the main multilateral groupings, such as the World Bank, the Group of Seven (G7) and the UN Security Council, but rather to find ways to increase their influence in what they consider is still the unrestricted dominance of the Western, primarily U.S., viewpoint in these bodies.
BRICS+ and their collective financial management. The BRICS+ countries created the New Development Bank (NBD) to finance the drive for infrastructure development and connectivity in their regions. This quickly became a reality and by 2022, it had already succeeded in granting loans to emerging countries for more than US$32 billion, for new roads, bridges, railroads and water supply projects. Some thematic areas underline its priorities:
- Increased representation in global organizations. BRICS aims to establish a united front of emerging economy perspectives in multilateral institutions. The group aims both to push for reform of existing institutions, such as the expansion of the UN Security Council, and to form negotiating blocs within those institutions. For example, many BRICS countries opposed UN condemnation of Russia's war in Ukraine and have sought common positions on Iran's nuclear program and the conflicts in Afghanistan, Gaza, Libya and Syria.
- Coordinate economic policy. The 2008 global recession hit the BRICS countries hard, leading the group to emphasize economic coordination on issues such as tariff policy, export restrictions on critical resources and investment. The bloc's annual foreign direct investment (FDI) flows more than quadrupled between 2001 and 2021, although they have slowed in recent years.
- Create an alternative financial system. The group's New Development Bank (NDB) and Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) aim to mimic the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), respectively. BRICS members hope that alternative lending institutions can invigorate South-South cooperation and reduce dependence on traditional sources of financing.
- Reduce dependence on the U.S. dollar. Increasingly unhappy with the dollar's dominance in global transactions, which exposes them to Western sanctions, BRICS leaders have long advocated de-dollarization in favor of greater trade in local currencies or even a possible common BRICS currency.
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